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Abstract: In this first paper of a series of works on the foundations of sci-
ence, we examine the significance of logical and mathematical frameworks used
in foundational studies. In particular, we emphasize the distinction between the
order of a language and the order of a structure to prevent confusing models of
scientific theories (as set-theoretical structures) with first-order structures (called
here order-1 structures), and which are studied in standard (first-order) model
theory. All of us are, of course, bound to make abuses of language even in puta-
tively precise contexts. This is not a problem—in fact, it is part of scientific and
philosophical practice. But it is important to be sensitive to the different uses that
structure, model, and language have. In this paper, we examine these topics in
the context of classical logic; only in the last section we touch upon briefly on
non-classical ones.
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QUESTO˜ES SOBRE OS FUNDAMENTOS DA CIEˆNCIA, I:
LINGUAGENS, ESTRUTURAS E MODELOS
Resumo: Neste primeiro artigo de uma se´rie de trabalhos sobre os fundamen-
tos da cieˆncia, investigamos a importaˆncia dos arcabouc¸os lo´gicos e matema´ticos
empregados nos estudos de fundamentos. Em particular, enfatizamos a distinc¸a˜o
entre a ordem de uma linguagem e ordem de uma estrutura, com o objetivo de evi-
tar confundir modelos de teorias cientı´ficas (como estruturas conjuntistas) com
estruturas de primeira ordem (que denominamos de estruturas de ordem-1), e
que sa˜o tratadas pela teoria usual de modelos de primeira ordem. Mesmo em
contextos que presumivelmente deveriam ser precisos, acabamos por nos valer
de abusos de linguagem. Na˜o reputamos esse uso como um problema—com
efeito, e´ parte tanto da pra´tica cientı´fica como filoso´fica. Mas cumpre atentar
aos diferentes usos que estrutura, modelo e linguagem possuem. Neste artigo,
examinanos esses to´picos no contexto da lo´gica cla´ssica; apenas na u´ltima sec¸a˜o
consideramos brevemente lo´gicas na˜o-cla´ssicas.
Palavras chave: Linguagens. Estruturas. Modelos de teorias cientı´ficas.
1 Introduction
The most common formal framework for mathematical discussions in the phi-
losophy of science (and in particular, the philosophy of physics) is provided by
first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice: ZFC (see, for
instance, Muller & Saunders 2008, Muller & Seevincki 2009).1 Why ZFC? As is
well known, there are several non-equivalent set theories, some of them have the-
orems that contradict those of ZFC. For instance, Quine and Rosser’s NF contains
a universal set, while ZFC, if consistent, does not.2 Foundational discussions can
also be articulated in terms of higher-order logics or even category theory. So,
why ZFC?
Suppose that it is claimed that that ZFC was chosen for pragmatic reasons,
such as familiarity, scope, simplicity, and so on. But such reasons do not end
1Although the axiom of choice is usually not mentioned in this context, it is important for certain
considerations. We will return to this point below.
2This remark must be read with some care, for sets in ZFC and in NF do not amount to the same
thing.
3the discussion. As usually presented, ZFC is a pure set theory, that is, is does
not involve things that are not sets, namely, Urelemente. But in the empirical
sciences—and sometimes even in mathematics—we may need to deal with col-
lections of objects that are not sets, such as collections of ants or planets. We may
say that, in cases such as these, we should use a set theory with Urelemente, for
sets are abstract objects, while ants and planets are not. But we have now moved
beyond purely pragmatic considerations to reasons dealing with the adequacy of
the formal framework to perform certain tasks.
Our goal here is to identify a cluster of philosophical issues that emerge as
soon as we pay attention to the mathematical frameworks that are used in foun-
dational issues about science. We do not intend to resolve such issues, but to
indicate their significance. In turn, the identification of these issues should help
to illuminate various aspects of foundational studies themselves. We will con-
sider them in what follows.
2 The relevance of mathematical frameworks
Although we could use a distinct framework, we shall follow here common prac-
tice and assume first-order ZFC.3 This allows us to speak of sets, functions, re-
lations, and all the usual mathematical concepts that are needed in ‘standard’
mathematics and science (particularly, in physics).4 Assuming ZFC is, of course,
no trivial matter, given the plurality of non-equivalent set theories available (some
of them articulate quite distinct conceptions of a set-theoretic universe).
Even in the scope of ‘standard’ set theory, in 1958 Skolem called attention to
a significant fact: the dependence of various semantic concepts (such as Tarski’s
characterization of truth) on the set-theoretic resources that are invoked in their
formution. In a remarkable (yet little known) passage, Skolen notes:
It is self-evident that the dubious character of the notion of set ren-
ders other notions dubious as well. For example, the semantic defini-
tion of mathematical truth proposed by A. Tarski and other logicians
presupposes the general notion of set. (Quoted in Moore 2009.)
In other words, as Skolem saw very clearly, Tarski’s semantic conception of truth
depends on the set theory that is used to express it. If that set theory changes,
3As is well known, the acceptance of ZFC was not immediate. For a discussion of the issue in the
context of the debates between Skolem, Zermelo, Bernays, Tarski and others, see Moore 2009.
4By ‘standard’ mathematics we mean the mathematics formulated in Bourbaki’s books.
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the properties of the concept of truth, as characterized by the theory, change
accordingly.
But the concept of truth is not the only one that depends on set-theoretic
resources. An important concept in quantum mechanics is that of an unbounded
operator, such as position and momentum linear operators. For instance, in the
Hilbert space L2(R) of the equivalence classes of square integrable functions,
we are dealing with unbounded operators. Recall that if A is a linear operator,
then A is bounded just in case for any M > 0 there exists a vector α such that
||A(α)|| ≤ M||α||. Otherwise, A is unbounded. In this context, Robert Solovay
proved a significant result. Suppose that ZF is consistent (here ‘ZF’ stands for
the theory ZFC without the axiom of choice), and suppose that DC stands for a
weakened form of the axiom of choice according to which a ‘countable’ version
of that axiom can be obtained. It then follows that ZF plus DC has a model in
which each subset of real numbers is Lebesgue measurable. (Assuming the full
version of the axiom of choice, it can be shown that there are subsets of the set of
real numbers that are not Lebesgue measurable.)5 Let us call ‘Solovay’s axiom’
(SA) the statement to the effect that ‘Any subset of R is Lebesgue measurable’. In
the set theory ZF+DC+SA (Solovay’s set theory), it can be proved that any linear
operator is bounded (see Maitland Wright 1973). As a result, if we use Solovay’s
set theory instead of standard ZF to build quantum structures, it is unclear how
unbounded operators can be accommodated. In other words, depending on the
set theory we consider, different properties of the relevant mathematical objects
emerge.
Here is an additional example of this situation (which also involves Robert
Solovay). One of the fundamental theorems related to quantum mechanics is
Gleason’s theorem, which shows the existence of certain probability measures
in separable Hilbert spaces. (There is no need for us to formulate the theorem
explicitly here.) Solovay obtained a generalization of the theorem also for non-
separable spaces, but it was necessary to assume the existence of a gigantic or-
thonormal basis whose cardinal is a measurable cardinal (see Chernoff 2009).
However, the existence of measurable cardinals cannot be proved in ZFC (assum-
ing that the latter is consistent). Thus, in order to obtain the generalization, we
need to go beyond ZFC. Examples such as these show that, for certain considera-
tions, it is extremely important to take into account the mathematical framework
under use. Once again, depending on the framework, different mathematical re-
sources are available.
5We shall not define here what a Lebesgue measure is. Intuitively speaking, it generalizes the
usual notion of measure, involving lengths, areas etc.
5Why are situations such as these important for the philosophy of science?
One of the tasks of foundational studies is to provide precise formulations of the
concepts under consideration, as well as to offer critical discussions and care-
ful expositions of relevant scientific theories. In particular, among the concepts
that are often used in philosophical examinations of science is that of a model
of a scientific theory. There are, however, different senses of ‘model’. On one
formulation, models are the structures that satisfy the postulates of a given the-
ory (whether in mathematics or in the empirical sciences), and these structures,
in turn, are typically sets formulated in a particular set theory, such as ZFC.
Consider, for example, group theory. The groups—that is, the models of group
theory—are structures of the form G = 〈G, ?〉, where G is a non-empty set and
? is a binary operation on G, obeying well-known postulates. The ordered pair
G is then a set (of ZFC, say). Similar characterizations of models is found in
geometry, algebra, classical analysis, and in the mathematical counterpart of any
physical theory.
But Solovay’s ‘model’ of ZF + DC mentioned above is not a ‘model’ in this
sense. Neither are the various ‘models’ of ZFC. That is, although ZF and ZFC,
if consistent, have ‘models’, the latter are not sets of ZF or ZFC. These ‘models’
must be formulated in stronger theories (see Brignole & da Costa 1971; Fraenkel
et al. 1973, §6.3).
Now, when we speak of the models of a scientific theory, such as usual quan-
tum mechanics (the formalism plus a certain interpretation), which mathematical
framework should we use to build such models? Presumably, in the quantum
mechanical case, it cannot be Solovay’s set theory in ZF+DC+SA, since we need
unbounded operators. Furthermore, in the Hilbert space formalism, we need to
speak of certain basis of the relevant spaces (e.g. those formed by eingenvectors
of self-adjoint operators), and for that we need the axiom of choice.6
As these examples illustrate, the choice of a suitable mathematical framework
is crucial. And the proper characterization of that framework depends, in part, on
the types and orders of the relevant structures. This is the topic to which we now
turn.
6Using the axiom of choice—in one of its versions, called Zorn’s lemma—it can be proved that
any vector space has a basis (see Halmos 1987, Appendix). In fact, the formalism of quantum me-
chanics requires the existence of the orthogonal complement of a subspace. But the existence of such
a complement is equivalent to the axiom of choice (see Jech 1973, theorem 10.12, p. 148).
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3 Structures
Model theory, as usually presented (see, for instance, Shoenfield 1967, Chapter
5; Chang & Keisler 1990) deals with what we call order–1 structures,7 namely,
structures of the kind:
A = 〈D, {a}i, {R j} j, { f }k〉i∈I, j∈J,k∈K (1)
where D is a non-empty set, ai are distinguished elements of D, R j are n-ary
relations on D, and fk are n-ary functions on D. Since n-ary functions can be
formulated as (n + 1)-ary relations, and given that each ai can be expressed as a
0-ary function, the above structure can be rewritten as follows:
A = 〈D, rι〉, (2)
where rι stands for a sequence of n-ary relations defined on D.
Note that the relations here relate the elements of the domain D. They do not
relate subsets of D or more complex sets constructed from D, such as subsets of D
and relations involving subsets of D and elements of D. That is, the elements of rι
are what we call order–1 relations only (and the corresponding structures will be
called order–1 structures). However, for more complex applications, mainly in
the empirical sciences, more general structures are required, sometimes involving
several domains and relations that are not of order–1. In some cases, we need to
consider relations whose relata are subsets of the domain, subsets of subsets of
the domain and other complex sets, such as functions, derivatives, differentiable
manifolds, Hilbert spaces, etc. In order to be more specific, we need to introduce
some basic definitions (based on da Costa & Rodrigues 2007). What we will
consider now is developed in ZF set theory, perhaps with the axiom of choice.
We denote by T the set of types, which is the smallest set such that (i) i ∈ T
(i is the type of the individuals), and (ii) if t1, . . . , tn ∈ T, then 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 ∈ T.
Thus, i, 〈i〉, 〈i, i〉, 〈〈i〉, i〉, 〈〈i〉〉 are types. Intuitively speaking, in this list we have:
types for individuals, for sets (or properties) of individuals, for binary relations
on individuals, binary relations whose relata are properties of individuals and
individuals, and properties of properties of individuals.
We define the order of a type t, which is denoted by Ord(t), as follows: (i)
Ord(i) = 0, and (ii) Ord(〈t1, . . . , tn〉) = max{Ord(t1), . . . ,Ord(tn)} + 1. Thus,
Ord(〈i〉) = Ord(〈i, i〉) = 1, while Ord(〈i, 〈i〉〉) = 2. Now let D be a set. Similarly
to da Costa and Rodrigues 2007, we also introduce the function tD with domain
7It will become clear below why this terminology is used.
7T: (i) tD(i) = D; (ii) if t1, . . . , tn ∈ T, then tD(〈t1, . . . , tn〉) = P(tD(t1)× . . .× tD(tn)).
For any t ∈ T, the objects belonging to tD(t) are said to be of type t, and the
objects of tD(i) are the individuals. If ε(D) :=
⋃
range(TD), we call ε(D) a scale
based on D. The elements of ε(D) that have types whose order is n > 0 are
called relations (of finite rank). In particular, unary relations are called sets or
properties. By definition, the order of a relation is the order of its type.8
Relations of types 〈i〉 (properties of individuals), 〈i, i〉 (binary relations on
individuals), 〈i, i, i〉 (ternary relations on individuals), and so on, are order–1 re-
lations. We shall not use the expression first-order relation to prevent confusion
with the order of a language, which will be defined below. Similarly, relations
of types 〈〈i〉〉, 〈〈i〉, i〉, and so on, are order–2 relations. Individuals are identified
with order–0 relations.
A structure A based on the set D is an ordered pair A = 〈D, rι〉; here, D , ∅
and rι is a sequence of n-ary relations belonging to ε(D). These relations are
called the primitive elements of the structure. Furthermore, we call kD the cardi-
nal associated with A, which is defined as kD = sup{|D|, |P(D)|, |P2(D)|, . . .}; here
|X| is the cardinal of the set X.
Let A = 〈D, rι〉 be a structure. Its order, Ord(A), is defined as follows: if there
is the greatest order of the relations in rι, the order of the structure is that order;
otherwise, it is ω. If a structure has order κ, we say that it is an order–κ struc-
ture. Groups are examples of order–1 structures, for they contain only order–1
relations (actually, they contain just one order–1 relation or of type 〈i, i, i〉, for the
binary operation on the domain can be seen as a ternary relation).9 More involved
structures can contain several sets, divided up into principal and secondary sets
(see Bourbaki 1968, Chapter 4). For instance, vector spaces are structures of the
form E = 〈V, F,+, ·〉; here V is the set of vectors, F is a field, + is a binary
operation on V (addition of vectors) and · is the multiplication of a vector by
an element of F, all of them obeying well-known axioms. Such structures can
still be represented via the general form (3), for the domain can be formulated
as the union of all principal and secondary sets, with suitable adaptations in the
definition of the relations in question.
However, the structures that are used in the formulation of significant scien-
tific theories, such as classical particle mechanics (Suppes 2002), non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, quantum field theory, special and general relativity, and so
8Note that, as an element of the scale ε(D), a relation has a type. For instance, a binary relation
on D is a subset of D × D, hence it has type t = 〈i, i〉.
9If we denote the binary operation on a set G as above by ?, so that the image of the pair 〈a, b〉 is
written a ? b, then this binary operation can be treated as the relation R = {〈a, b, a ? b〉 : a, b, c ∈ G}.
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on, are not order-1 structures. After all, the formulation of such structures in-
volves various domains and relations that are not of order–1, e.g., as we noted
above, subsets of the domain, subsets of subsets of the domain, and more intri-
cate sets (derivatives, differentiable manifolds, Hilbert spaces, and so on). Thus,
the mathematical theory in which such structures are studied is not the usual
first-order model theory. Although we still lack a thorough theory of higher-
order structures, generalized Galois theory provides a framework for the study
of such structures (see da Costa & Rodrigues 2007). But there is much yet to be
done.
4 Languages
The explicit separation between first- and higher-order languages appeared for
the first time in Hilbert and Ackermann’s 1928 book (see Hilbert & Ackermann
1950), although it had been considered before, for instance, by Lo¨wenheim in
1915 and by Skolem in the early 1920s. The distinction is now familiar: first-
order languages allow for the quantification over only individuals of the domain
of interpretation, not over properties, functions, or sets of such individuals. To
quantify over all of the latter, we need higher-order languages.
As is also well known, ZFC can be axiomatized as a first-order theory. Al-
though today the first-order formulation of ZFC is widely accepted, this was not
always the case. In fact, Zermelo himself was never comfortable with Skolem’s
axiomatization of ZFC as a first-order theory. 10
The first-order language of ZFC will be denoted by L∈, and we assume that
it has only one non-logical symbol — namely, the binary predicate ∈ — and
no individual constants (although the latter can be considered in an alternative
formulation).
Suppose we have a structure A = 〈D, rι〉, defined in L∈, whose domain D
comprises several sets, and the relations in rι are order-n relations (n ≥ 1). Since
L∈ does not contain individual constants, we need to enlarge L∈ with new ob-
jects in order to represent, for instance, A, D, and the primitive relations of the
structure. In this way, for instance, by enlarging the language L∈ with the sym-
bols G and ?, a group structure can be built, and by adding V , K, +, · (among
other symbols), vector spaces can be formulated as well. These are the primitive
symbols of the (corresponding) structures.
10Gregory Moore provides an insightful discussion of the issue in the context of the debate regard-
ing the underlying logic of set theory (see Moore 1980, and Moore 2009).
9However, not only do we need to speak of these structures, but also of all
the objects of the scale built on D, ε(D). And depending on our needs, infinitary
languages may be used. In order to show the power of L∈, we shall exemplify
below how an infinitary language (and higher-order languages in general) can be
built using the first-order extended language L∈ plus specific symbols. A typical
case is that of a language Lηµκ; here µ, κ, and η are cardinals such that κ ≤ µ and
1 ≤ η ≤ ω, and ω is the first infinite cardinal. In this language, we can form
conjunctions and disjunctions of sets of formulas of cardinality less than µ, and
blocks of quantifiers of length less than κ. We then have first-order languages
when η = 1, second-order languages when η = 2, and so on, until η = ω, which
is an order–ω language suitable for type theory.
As an example, consider a language such as L1ω1ω. In this language, we can
write formulas with denumerably many conjunctions and disjunctions, such as
the formula we abbreviate by: x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ x = 2 ∨ . . . This formulate states
that x is a natural number. (Note, however, that this expression is not a formula
of our language, for the dots ‘. . .’ are not symbols of L∈.) Usual first-order
languages are of the kind L1ωω.
To give an idea of how significantly strong languages can be constructed in
first-order ZFC, let us sketch the language Lωω1ω(R). Here ‘R’ stands for the col-
lection of the primitive symbols (relations) of a certain structure we are interested
in. For instance, we could consider all those languages whose cardinals can be
defined in ZFC.11 The languageLωω1ω(R) can be described in the following terms.
First, we suppose that set T of types has been defined as above. The primitive
symbols are as follows:
(i) Sentential connectives: ¬, ∧, ∨,→,∧, and∨.
(ii) Quantifiers: ∀ and ∃.
(iii) For each type t, a family of variables of type t whose cardinal is ω.
(iv) For each type t, a family of constants of type t (some of them may be
empty). All constants for the set R.
(v) Primitive relations: for any type t, a collection of constants of that type
(some of them may be empty).
(vi) Parentheses: left and right parentheses (‘(’ and ‘)’), and comma (‘,’).
11This excludes, of course, measurable cardinals, since their existence cannot be proved in ZFC
(assuming the latter’s consistency).
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(vii) Equality: For each type t, an equality symbol =t of type t = 〈t1, t2〉, with
t1 and t2 of the same type.
Variables and constants of type t are terms of that type. If T is a term of
type 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 and T1, . . . ,Tn are terms of types t1, . . . , tn respectively, then
T (T1, . . . ,Tn) is an atomic formula. If T1 and T2 are terms of the same type
t, then T1 =〈t1,t2〉 T2 is an atomic formula. We shall write T1 = T2 for this last
formula, leaving the types implicit. If α, β, αi are formulas (i = 1, . . . ), then
¬α, α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α→ β,∧αi, and∨αi are formulas. It is then possible to con-
struct formulas with denumerably many conjunctions and disjunctions, which we
write informally, for instance, as: α1 ∧ α2 ∧ . . . Furthermore, if X is a variable of
type t, then ∀Xα and ∃Xα are also formulas (only finite blocks of quantifiers are
allowed). These are the only formulas of the language.12
What does it mean to construct a language such as Lωω1ω(R) in ZFC? In the
intended interpretation, the individual variables of L∈ range over sets. However,
if we consider ZFC as a formal theory, there is no interpretation associated with
its language. Thus, all the primitive symbols of Lωω1ω(R) are terms of L∈. If
we assign to them the intended interpretation, these symbols stand for sets. So,
‘(’, the left parenthesis, is a name of a set, and the same point goes for all the
sequences of symbols in the language. In this way, by assigning suitable sets to
symbols in Lωω1ω(R) , the latter is eventually constructed in ZFC.13
Let again A = 〈D, rι〉 be a structure. And let us suppose that this structure rep-
resents some domain of knowledge, perhaps in the empirical sciences.14 In some
cases, the relations in A are partial, thereby reflecting the partiality of the infor-
mation available about the domain in question (see da Costa & French 2003).
The relations in rι are the primitive relations of the structure. For instance, in
Suppes’s humans paternity theory, besides a domain D of human beings, he ad-
mits two subsets of D, M and L, which stand for the set of males and the set of
living human beings, respectively. We can consider these subsets as representing
properties of human beings: those humans who are male belong to M; those who
are alive belong to L. Moreover, the structure also includes a binary relation P,
defined on D, such that for every x and y in D, Pxy is satisfied as long as x is the
father of y. In this case, M, L, and P are the primitive relations (which here also
12The concepts of free and bound variables and other syntactic concepts are introduced as usual.
13As noted above, in order to accommodate the objects of the empirical sciences, which clearly are
not sets, it would be better to employ ZFU rather than ZFC.
14We find here yet another sense of ‘model’, which stands for the ‘mathematization’ of a given
domain, as exemplified by the work of engineers and applied scientists.
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include primitive properties) of the structure, satisfying suitable postulates (see
Suppes 1969).
Let us now suppose that A = 〈D, rι〉 is a structure whose relations are of
order–n, with n ≥ 1, and ε(D) is the scale based on D. In order to speak of this
structure and the objects of its scale, we need a higher-order language. According
to the definitions above, rι is a sequence of relations of the scale ε(D), that is,
it is a mapping from a finite ordinal into a collection of relations in the scale.
In this case, rng(rι) stands for the set of these relations. And Lωωω(rng(rι)) (or
Lω(rng(rι)) for short) is the language whose only constants are the primitive
relations of the structure. This language will be called the basic language of
the structure. (Of course, this is not the only possible language, for stronger
languages incorporating it could be used as well.)
In this way, we can interpret a sentence of rng(rι) in A = 〈D, rι〉, and define
the concept of truth for sentences of this language (according to the structure in
question) in the Tarskian sense. As usual, this is denoted by:
A |= S . (3)
We can similarly define the concept of validity. A sentence S is valid (which we
denote by |= S ) if E |= S , for every structure E. The concept of truth can be
extended to the whole scale (since the latter is also a set), and in this way we can
also speak of a sentence being true in a scale, as we shall do below. If we consider
partial relations as primitive relations in the relevant structure, the concept of
truth must be that of partial truth, which generalizes Tarski’s approach and is
more adequate for the empirical sciences (for details, see da Costa & French
2003).
Finally, note that we have been describing a higher-order language using the
resources of first-order ZFC. Even the structure A = 〈D, rι〉, which need not be
an order–1 structure, is being constructed in that set theory.
4.1 Definability
Our goal now is to formulate some conditions under which an object of a scale
ε(D) is definable in a structure A = 〈D, rι〉 by a formula of Lω(rng(rι)) in such
a way that an element of the scale is expressible in the structure with respect to
a sequence of objects of the scale. We will not discuss all of the details here,
but only provide the main definitions in order to extend the standard definitions
for first-order structures (see Shoenfield 1967, p. 135). The issue is important,
since in order to represent a domain by a certain structure in a given language,
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we need to know whether the relevant objects can in fact be so represented with
the resources available.
Let R be a relation of type t = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 and A = 〈D, rι〉 be a structure. We
say that R is definable in A if there is a formula F(x1, x2, . . . , xn) of Lω(rng(rι))
whose only free variables are x1, . . . , xn of types t1, . . . , tn, respectively, such that
in Lω(rng(rι)) ∪{R}, the formula
∀x1 . . .∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ F(x1, x2, . . . , xn))
is true in ε(D).
For instance, in Lω(rng(rι)), for each type t we can define an identity relation
=t of type 〈i, i〉 as follows. Let Z be a variable of type 〈t〉. Then we can easily see
that for suitable structures and scales, the following is true:
∃!It∀x∀y(It(x, y)↔ ∀Z(Z(x)↔ Z(y))).
It can be called the identity of type t, and we can write x =t y for It(x, y). Intu-
itively, this means that identity, as usual, is defined by Leibniz Law. In fact, the
definition just given can be rewritten in the following way:
x =t y := ∀Z(Z(x)↔ Z(y)).
Usually, we suppress the index t and write x = y, leaving the type implicit. (The
relation = is of type 〈t, t〉, while x and y are both of type t.)
This kind of definability, which involves structures and scales, is called se-
mantic definability, and goes back to Tarski’s work. Another important case,
also involving semantic definability, is the following. Let A = 〈D, rι〉, ε(D) and
Lω(rng(rι)) be a structure, a scale, and a language, respectively, as introduced
above. Given an object a ∈ ε(D) of type t, we say that it is Lω(rng(rι))-definable,
or definable in the strict sense, in A = 〈D, rι〉 if there is a formula F(x), whose
only free variable x is of type t, such that:
A |= ∀x(x =t a↔ F(x)). (4)
As an example, let N = 〈ω,+, ·, s, 0〉 be an order–1 structure for first-order
arithmetic.15 In order to define any particular natural number, we only need a
finitary language, such as Lωωω(R) with R = {0, s}. It is then easy to see that:
N |= ∀x(x = n↔ x = ss . . . s(0)),
15Strictly speaking, we should have written {0} rather than 0, but we will proceed in this way.
13
here ss . . . s(0) abbreviates a formula of the language. If we use a suitable in-
finitary language, such as Lω1ω (in which denumerably many conjunctions and
disjunctions are allowed), we can write inside the parentheses of the previous
formula:
x ∈ ω↔ x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ . . . ,
which allows us to define all natural numbers (assuming, of course, that we have
devised a way of referring to each one of them).
Can everything be defined in this way? Not really, since definability is a
relative concept, which depends on the resources of the languages we use. Here
are a couple of examples to motivate this point. First, as is well known, in ZFC
(assuming its consistency), the set R of real numbers is not denumerable. Thus, if
we use a standard denumerable language, we do not have enough names to name
each real number, and cannot define them by the condition just given above.
However, if we adopt a suitable infinitary languageLνκ, with appropriate ν and κ,
it is possible to provide a name for each real number (after all, each real number
can be used to name itself). In this infinitary language, real numbers can then
be defined by the condition above. Second, it can proved in ZFC that every set
is well-ordered. In particular, R has a well-ordering. However, as is also well
known, we cannot define this well-ordering by a formula of L∈. In fact, the
least element of the subset (0, 1), for instance, which exists, is also not definable
in that language. As these examples indicate, definability and expressibility (of
elements in a giving language) depend on the language that is used. In the end,
these are language dependent, relativized concepts — rather than absolute ones.
Far more could be said about these issues. But we hope we have said enough
to motivate the distinction between the order of a language and the order of a
structure, and to illustrate that even with the resources of first-order languages
(such as L∈, the language of ZFC), we can construct higher-order structures and
languages (for further details, see da Costa & Rodrigues 2007). We will now
consider the significance of these issues to the empirical sciences.
5 Leaving standard frameworks behind
In our discussion so far we have assumed a ‘classical’ framework, in the sense
that we have invoked classical logic and the standard mathematics built in ZFC.
But we also noted some cases in which we need to go beyond ZFC. Solovay’s
generalization of Gleason’s theorem is such a case, as well as the use of cate-
gory theory to formulate certain physical theories, as recently discussed by John
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Baez.16
But we should also consider the use of non-classical logics, and not just ‘ex-
tensions’ of classical mathematics (which is the case of category theory and ZFC
supplemented by strong axioms, such as those that postulate the existence of
universes). For instance, if we intend to axiomatize Bohr’s theory of the atom,
we may need some kind of paraconsistent logic, since Bohr’s theory seems to
be inconsistent (da Costa & French 2003). Bressan claimed that modal logic is
needed in physics (Bressan 1974), while Reichenbach (1944), Fe´vrier (1951), da
Costa & Krause (2005) and others have suggested the use of many-valued logics
in quantum mechanics.17
Needless to say, the strength of languages such as L∈ is so great that virtually
everything that is needed for scientific practice can be expressed in it. In fact,
when scientists develop their informal mathematical theories (that is, when they
formulate ‘informal mathematical models’, since they typically do not work in an
axiomatic setting), there is usually no need for them to go beyond the mathemat-
ics that can be developed in a fragment of ZFC. However, this fact may conceal
a significant philosophical issue. For when we consider foundational problems,
the use of non-classical frameworks may be needed to articulate certain assump-
tions scientists implicitly make when they develop their own theories. Moreover,
a non-classical framework may also be required to express and maintain certain
philosophical views about science. In either case, the need for going beyond the
classical framework emerges. To illustrate this point, let us consider an example.
Steven French (forthcoming) has argued that a metaphysical underdetermi-
nation arises from quantum statistics. The (non-relativistic) quantum mechanical
formalism is compatible with two ‘metaphysical packages’: according to one of
them, elementary particles are individuals; according to the other, they are non-
individuals. As he notes:
The (now)18 standard example of metaphysical underdetermination
arises from quantum statistics. Philosophical reflection on the ‘new’
quantum mechanics was entwined with the development of the physics
itself, with Born and Heisenberg, for example, suggesting that quan-
tum statistics—both the Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac varieties—
implied that particles could no longer be regarded as individuals (see
16See his homepage, http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/categories.html.
17Additional works along these lines, mainly dealing with quantum theory, are discussed in Jammer
(1974), Chapter 8.
18French has also discussed other instances of underdetermination.
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French and Krause 2006, pp. 94-115). For many years this was ef-
fectively the ‘received’ view of the matter, until it was argued that
such particles could be regarded as individuals, subject to certain
constraints (French 1989; van Fraassen 1989; French and Krause
2006). With the development of ‘non-standard’ logico-mathematical
frameworks suitable for accommodating the ‘Received’ view’s ‘non-
individuals’ and a detailed understanding of the aforementioned con-
straints, two distinct metaphysical packages can be elaborated, con-
sistent with the physics: particles-as-non-individuals (described via
quasi-set theory) [see French and Krause 2006] and particles-as-
individuals (subject to certain state accessibility constraints). (French,
forthcoming.)
This is an important point, and we can echo it from a different point of view.
Consider the case of bosons. As is well known, in certain situations, these quan-
tum entities share the same quantum state and are absolutely indistinguishable,
that is, it is not possible to distinguish them. As an example, consider a system
of two bosons, a and b, and two possible states, A and B. According to quantum
mechanics, there are three possibilities of distributing such bosons over these
states. These possibilities are known as ‘Bose-Einstein statistics’, and they are
expressed by suitable vectors in a given Hilbert space:
(i) |ψab〉 = |ψAa 〉|ψAb 〉 (that is, the joint system is composed by both bosons in
the same state A);
(ii) |ψab〉 = |ψBa 〉|ψBb 〉 (i.e., both bosons are in state B);
(iii) |ψab〉 = (1/
√
2)(|ψAa 〉|ψBb 〉+|ψAb 〉|ψBa 〉) (that is, one boson is in state A, while
the other is in B; here ‘1/
√
2’ is just a mathematical trick).
A fundamental postulate then states that, in (iii), it is not possible to determine
which boson is in state A and which is in B. The labels, a and b, are thus just
convenient devices: they do not presuppose the individuation of each boson.
Consider now the mathematics that is used to formulate quantum theory. It
is typically based on a standard set theory, such as ZFC. The simple fact that we
have two bosons — that is, two objects whose set has cardinal 2 — is enough
to make them different. A set, Cantor noted a long time ago, is a collection of
distinct objects. But as a result, there does not seem to be room for indiscernible
objects in standard set theories, that is, objects that cannot be distinguished in
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any way, except if we confine ourselves to a non-rigid structure (built in ZFC).19
20
The ‘solution’ to this problem sketched above in the framework of standard
mathematics — namely, to work with symmetric vectors — only conceals the real
difficulty. When we consider the symmetric vector (iii), we are simply putting
aside the distinction between a and b that we had initially made. In fact, we had
supposed that the vectors |ψa〉 and |ψb〉 describe the bosons, we had labeled or
‘named’ the latter, and thus we had counted them as two. The maneuver is fine
for certain purposes, and the practice of physics works quite well in this way.
However, from a foundational point of view, there is a philosophical difficulty
here. The simple fact that two elementary particles, e.g. two electrons, are char-
acterized by different wave functions in classical logic makes them distinct. It is
then unclear how they can possibly be indiscernible (or ‘identical’ in the physi-
cist’s jargon).
An answer we favor, and that we can only sketch here, consists in distinguish-
ing three levels of the language in use. Let us suppose again that A = 〈D, rı〉 is
a structure, whose language (in the sense discussed above) is L∈(R). We then
have the following ‘working levels’ of language: (i) In the syntactic level, we
formulate and articulate scientific concepts, define the relevant elements, and so
on. (ii) The semantic level is divided into two additional levels: (a) In the formal
semantic level, we work inside the structure A and obey its limits, e.g. we call ‘in-
discernible’ (relative to that structure) those elements (of the domain) which are
invariant under the automorphisms of the structure. (b) In the informal seman-
tic level, we find implicit ‘interpretations’, according to which, e.g., ‘electron’
designates a certain entity etc. (iii) Finally, the third level is pragmatic, and it
involves assumptions that strictly speaking are not part of the relevant theories,
but which are required for the latter to function properly; for instance, the be-
19But even in this case the indistinguishability is only relative to the relations of the structure,
for any structure in ZFC can be extended to a rigid one (see da Costa & Rodrigues 2007). A rigid
structure only has one automorphism, namely, the identity function. In general, two objects of the
domain of a structure A are said to be indiscernible in A if there is an automorphism of A (i.e. a
bijective function on its domain that ‘preserves’ all the relations of the structure) which leads one of
them into the other. In a rigid structure, the elements are indiscernible only to themselves.
20As an additional example, recall the fact that, given the axiom of choice, the set R of real numbers
is well ordered. This entails that any subset of R has a least element. Thus, if we consider two
disjoint subsets, e.g. the intervals (0, 1) and (2, 3), their least elements are of course distinct, although
we cannot define them in accordance with the definitions given above. (We cannot even name them
using the standard language L∈ properly extended to accommodate real analysis.) In other words,
even if we cannot represent the least element of a subset of R relative to a well ordering of R, this
element is different from any other real number.
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havior of measuring apparatuses, the way we read their results and advance the
phenomenological counterpart of a given theory.
These levels can be, and often are, incompatible with each other. This fact
need not trouble us. Indeed, scientists apparently are not that worried about con-
tradictions, for they seem to avoid the latter by taking refuge in suitable (appar-
ently) consistent sub-theories. Even from a foundational point of view, we can
accommodate this apparent inconsistency by invoking a paraconsistent logic (da
Costa et al. 2007). But this is, of course, a topic for another occasion.
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